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LINDA SILBERMAN† 
To be objective about the role of conflict of laws in the treatment 
of same-sex marriage, it is helpful to start with tolerance for the views 
of both sides in the substantive debate over whether to permit same-
sex marriage.  I begin with this observation because much of the writ-
ing about conflict of laws issues and the recognition of same-sex mar-
riage is far from neutral on that issue.1  Unless and until the Supreme 
Court determines that a prohibition on same-sex marriage is unconsti-
tutional as a matter of federal law, it is within the prerogative of each 
individual state to determine what status to accord to same-sex couples 
who want to formalize their relationship and/or what rights should 
attach to such relationships.  The view about same-sex marriage that is 
taken by a particular state (in the United States) or by a particular 
country reflects the set of values accepted in that community as de-
termined through its own political processes, whether expressed in 
state constitutional amendments, statutes enacted by the legislature, 
or by judicial decisions declared in the courts.2 
 
 † Martin Lipton Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; B.A. Univer-
sity of Michigan (1965); J.D. University of Michigan (1968).  I am especially indebted 
to Karin Wolfe, my former research assistant and 2000 graduate of New York University 
School of Law and presently a Fulbright Fellow at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität 
in Munich, Germany, with whom I co-authored a related article; Karin has continued 
to provide valuable research help on this and other projects, particularly with respect 
to many of the foreign and comparative sources upon which I rely.  Thanks are also 
due to my present research assistant, Anderson Bailey, a second-year student at New 
York University School of Law, who provided valuable cite-checking assistance, served 
as my in-house editor, and engaged in helpful discussions with me on these issues. 
 This Essay represents an adaptation of the presentation I gave on this topic at the 
“Current Debates in the Conflict of Laws” Symposium sponsored by the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review.  My thanks to the other panelists, Professors Herma Hill Kay, 
Andrew Koppelman, and Tobias Wolff, for their thoughtful papers and comments, to 
Professor Kim Roosevelt for organizing the program and inviting me to participate, to 
the members of the Law Review for their professionalism and flexibility regarding pub-
lication, and to all the attendees for their provocative questions and discussion. 
1 Indeed some is uniquely personal.  See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Using an “Incidents of 
Marriage” Analysis When Considering Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Couples’ Marriages, 
Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 13 WIDENER L.J. 699, 699 (2004). 
2 See Linda Silberman & Karin Wolfe, The Importance of Private International Law for 
Family Issues in an Era of Globalization:  Two Case Studies—International Child Abduction 
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With respect to the United States as a whole, there is an argument 
that the entire question of marriage and divorce regulation should be 
subject to a uniform standard, perhaps best achieved at the federal 
level.3  Some countries with federal systems do subject marriage and 
divorce regulation to national treatment.4  Federal law on these issues 
would avoid many of the difficulties that arise when parties marry or 
divorce in one state and then move to another.  If a national standard 
were in place, rights of the marital partners would not be affected by 
their movement across state lines.5  Of course, the substance of any 
“national” standard could go either way in the debate over same-sex 
marriage.  One possible interpretation of the present U.S. Constitu-
tion could result in preventing states from classifying marriage as a 
status reserved for persons of different sexes—that would in effect 
mean any state providing for the marital relationship would have to 
make it available to couples regardless of their sexual orientation and 
would establish a single uniform standard.6  Alternatively, the recently 
proposed amendment to the U.S. Constitution—which failed to win 
the two-thirds majority necessary to pass the House and be submitted 
to the states for ratification—would have restricted marriage to one 
man and one woman.7  Such an amendment also creates a national 
standard on marriage, but would prevent all same-sex marriages. 
 
and Same-Sex Unions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 233, 247-48 (2003) [hereinafter Private Inter-
national Law for Family Issues]. 
3 Such uniformity could be achieved through federal legislation and, to a lesser 
degree, through uniform state laws.  There was thought at one time that a constitu-
tional amendment would be necessary to justify federal law on the subject.  See James 
Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 918 & n.249, 919 (2000) (discussing 
the interest in federally enforced uniformity for divorce laws in the early twentieth cen-
tury).  For an interesting historical account of the movement for uniform divorce legis-
lation, see James J. White, Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2106-28 (1991). 
4 For example, in Germany family law is within the realm of federal law and regu-
lation by the states is preempted.  See GRUNDGESETZ [GG] arts. 72, 74; §§ 1297-1921 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB].  In Australia, federal legislation—the Family Law 
Act of 1975, the Family Law Reform Act of 1995, and subsequent amendments—
governs family law matters. 
5 Issues of recognition of such relationships would still arise if the parties move 
across national boundaries. 
6 The analogy is to the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967), which held state laws prohibiting interracial marriages to be unconstitutional. 
7 See Helen Dewar, House Rejects Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 2004, 
at A27, available at 2004 WL 93180301 (discussing the vote and opponents’ criticisms).  
The possibility of re-introducing an amendment remains, and President Bush has an-
nounced his support for such an amendment.  See Richard W. Stevenson, White House 
Again Backs Amendment on Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2005, at A15, available at 2005 
WLNR 620844 (detailing comments made by President Bush during interviews show-
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Pluralism in the United States has always made national consensus 
on a variety of family matters difficult.  Long before the issue of same-
sex marriage came to the fore, similar conflict-of-laws issues arose with 
respect to interracial marriages and the application of miscegenation 
statutes,8 as well as over grounds for divorce and the ability to obtain 
migratory divorces.9  Historically, issues of family law—marriage, di-
vorce, and custody—have generally been left to the states to establish 
according to their own community norms.10  Accordingly, the present 
landscape allows each state in the United States to make the choice 
about same-sex marriage (and civil unions and registered domestic 
partnerships, for that matter) for itself.11  But because parties in mari-
tal relationships often act outside their community or move elsewhere 
and establish a new home base, other states must address the rights 
and obligations of the parties to a union that they may have prevented 
altogether.12  This Essay offers a normative analysis for these conflict-
of-laws issues in a fashion that I believe best reflects the needs and val-
ues of our federal system, giving genuine respect to the decision made 
in a relevant community about the desirability of permitting same-sex 
marriages. 
 
ing his continued support for a ban). 
8 See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and Public Policy:  The Miscege-
nation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105 (1996). 
9 See generally NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO:  A HISTORY OF DI-
VORCE IN THE UNITED STATES (1962). 
10 The reasons are explored in Ann C. Dailey, Federalism and Families, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1787 (1995).  See also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH 295-96 
(1985). 
11 For an examination of the question of how and by whom the issue of same-sex 
marriage should be resolved in the United States, see Kevin J. Worthen, Who Decides 
and What Difference Does It Make?:  Defining Marriage in “Our Democratic, Federal Republic,” 
18 BYU J. PUB. L. 273 (2004). 
12 There has been extensive commentary on the subject.  For a representative sam-
pling, see Patrick J. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors:  Implications for Interjurisdictional 
Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998); Deborah M. 
Henson, Will Same-Sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?:  Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process Limitations on States’ Choice of Law Regarding the Status and Incidents of Homo-
sexual Marriages Following Hawaii’s Baehr v. Lewin, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 551 
(1994); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 921 (1998) [hereinafter Same-Sex Marriage]; Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, 
Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997); 
Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?:  A Comment on Same-Sex 
Marriage and Federalism Values, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 191 (1996) [hereinafter Can the 
Island of Hawaii Bind the World?]; Michael E. Solimine, Competitive Federalism and Inter-
state Recognition of Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 83 (1998). 
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I.  THE EVASION SCENARIO 
The conflict-of-laws issues arise in a variety of different contexts.  
The “easiest” case for me is what I refer to as the “evasion” case.  An 
evasion case arises in the following way:  assume a state in the United 
States or elsewhere decides to authorize same-sex marriage—at one 
time it looked like this state might be Hawaii;13 now it might be Massa-
chusetts,14 New York,15 California,16 or possibly one of the Canadian 
provinces.17  A same-sex couple from another state that does not per-
mit same-sex marriage—say Pennsylvania—travels to Massachusetts to 
get married and then returns home to Pennsylvania.  How should one 
view the out-of-state marriage?  If one brings a modern conflict-of-laws 
analysis to bear on this subject, the way to understand the law author-
izing same-sex marriage is to view it as a social, moral, and political 
judgment that affects members of a particular community—i.e., those 
 
13 The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reh’g 
granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), appeal after remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 
950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997), held that Hawaii’s marriage law constituted discrimination 
on the basis of sex under the Hawaii Constitution and remanded the case to allow the 
State to try to establish a compelling state interest. A subsequent amendment to the 
Hawaii Constitution reserved the legislature’s power to limit marriage to couples of the 
opposite sex.  HAW. CONST. art. 1, § 23.  In Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999), 
the state constitutional challenge was held to be moot due to the amendment chang-
ing the state constitution.  See generally David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage 
Amendment:  Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000). 
14 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003), discussed 
infra at pages 2200-01; see also Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 
569-71 (Mass. 2004) (advising that a proposed civil union bill would not cure the con-
stitutional infirmity). 
15 A recent decision by a New York City trial judge held that New York’s domestic 
relations law defining marriage as between a man and a woman violated the New York 
Constitution.  See Hernandez v. Robles, No. 103434/2004, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. Feb. 4, 2005).  But decisions by other courts in New York have rejected similar chal-
lenges.  See, e.g., Shields v. Madigan, 783 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 2004).  An expedited 
appeal in the Hernandez case was denied, delaying a ruling by the state’s highest court, 
the Court of Appeals.  See Sabrina Tavernise, New York Court Refuses Gay Marriage Suits, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at B2. 
16 See Marriage Cases, Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding No. 4365, 2005 
WL 583129 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2005) (finding that sections 300 and 308.5 of the 
California Family Code, defining marriage as a union between a man and a woman, 
violate the equal protection clause of the state constitution).  Compare Lockyer v. City 
& County of S.F., 33 Cal. 4th 1055 (2004).  In Lockyer, the California Supreme Court 
voided all marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples in contravention of sections 300 
and 308.5.  The court held that the public officials who issued the licenses exceeded 
their ministerial authority when they acted on their belief that the statutes were uncon-
stitutional.  The opinion also noted, however, that same-sex marriages would be valid if 
the unconstitutionality was judicially determined. 
17 See infra note 37. 
  
2005] REFINING THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ANALYSIS 2199 
individuals who are and will be residing in Massachusetts.  When a 
couple from Pennsylvania—that is, two Pennsylvanians who live in 
Pennsylvania and who will return to live in Pennsylvania—come to get 
married in Massachusetts, Massachusetts has little justification for ex-
tending its law to them.  In conflict-of-laws terminology, Massachusetts 
has no interest in applying its law to this case.18  In this situation, there 
is not only a question of the recognition of the marriage in Pennsyl-
vania, but also whether the Massachusetts rule about same-sex mar-
riage should or constitutionally even could extend to these individu-
als.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Phillips Petroleum & Co. v. 
Shutts19 suggests that Massachusetts may be constitutionally disabled 
from applying its law in such a case since it has no policy justification 
for regulating the capacity of these parties to marry.  If, however, 
same-sex marriage were permitted in the state where the parties were 
resident or domiciled—or even possibly if there were no impediment 
to such a marriage in that state—Massachusetts might have reason to 
extend the “courtesy” of a marriage ceremony to the couple because 
to do so would not infringe upon the interest of the other state. 
Some might argue that the long history and tradition of the “place 
of celebration” rule could be invoked to reject any argument that ap-
plying the law where the marriage takes place is unconstitutional,20 but 
 
18 Modern conflict-of-laws analysis looks to ascertain a policy or “interest” that is 
furthered by the application of a particular law to the facts in the case.  “Interests” can 
result because of the state’s concern with its residents or domiciliaries or due to its pol-
icy of encouraging or discouraging particular activities in the state.  However, certain 
“interests” would not be legitimate interests, such as a Massachusetts interest in attract-
ing marriages to be conducted in-state so as to foster hotel and catering businesses in 
Massachusetts.  But see Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative 
Incentives to Recognize Same-Sex Marriage, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 745 (1995) (identifying the 
economic advantages for a state in celebrating same-sex marriages for out-of-state cou-
ples).  Such a parasitic interest that is achieved only from evading the genuine policies 
of other states would not qualify as legitimate for purposes of interest analysis.  See 
Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 12, at 942 n.63. 
19 472 U.S. 797 (1985).  In Shutts, in the context of a nationwide class action, the 
Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for Kansas to apply its own law to the 
claims of class members who were not residents of Kansas and where the transactions 
giving rise to their claims had no connection with Kansas.  Id. at 814; see also Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) (“[F}or a State’s substantive law to be 
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a significant 
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice 
of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”). 
20 Justice Scalia has drawn upon history and tradition as a basis for refusing to 
overturn traditional choice of law rules, such as the “procedural characterization” of 
statutes of limitations, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 728-29 (1988) (“In 
sum, long established and still subsisting choice-of-law practices that come to be 
thought, by modern scholars, unwise, do not thereby become unconstitutional.”), and 
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there have always been exceptions to the place of celebration rule that 
mirror similar interests expressed in laws prohibiting same-sex mar-
riages at the state of the parties’ domicile.21 The lack of a justifiable 
“interest” (in conflicts terminology) by the state of celebration in ex-
tending its laws to cases of evasion was acknowledged in Goodridge v. 
Department of Public Health22—the recent Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts decision upholding same-sex marriage.  In his concur-
ring opinion, in a footnote that initially went unnoticed by some, Jus-
tice Greaney explained that the court’s ruling requiring Massachusetts 
to license same-sex couples would be limited to Massachusetts resi-
dents;23 Justice Greaney called attention to two state statutes that af-
fected the impact of the holding.  One statute prohibits the marriage 
of any party residing and continuing to reside in another jurisdiction, 
 
for upholding potentially outdated jurisdictional rules, see Burnham v. Superior Court, 
495 U.S. 604 (1990) (upholding transient presence of the defendant in the forum state 
as a basis for jurisdiction). 
21 The place of celebration rule, adopted in section 121 of the First Restatement of 
Conflicts, also contained this exception for cases where recognition would run afoul of 
the domiciliary state’s strong public policy.  Section 132 of the First Restatement pro-
vided: 
A marriage which is against the law of the state of domicil of either party, 
though the requirements of the law of the state of celebration have been 
complied with, will be invalid everywhere in the following cases: 
(a) polygamous marriage, 
(b) incestuous marriage between persons so closely related that their mar-
riage is contrary to a strong public policy of the domicil, 
(c) marriage between persons of different races where such marriages are at 
the domicil regarded as odious, 
(d) marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the domicil makes void even 
though celebrated in another state. 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 132 (1934).  In addition, section 129 of 
the First Restatement, which adopted the place of celebration rule even where the parties 
crossed state lines in order to evade the requirement of the law of their domicile, also 
included as an exception the circumstances stated in section 132.  Id. § 129.  See gener-
ally Developments in the Law:  Constitutional Constraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Rec-
ognition, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2028, 2037 (2003) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] 
(“Domicile, then, is the paramount ‘interest-creating contact’ between a state and a 
marriage.”); Willis L.M. Reese, Marriage in American Conflict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 952 (1977) (observing that domicile at the time of marriage appears to trigger the 
interest in invalidating a marriage on grounds of public policy). 
22 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
23 Id. at 972 n.4 (Greaney, J., concurring) (noting that Massachusetts law would 
preclude the use of “legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts . . . as a tool to 
obtain recognition of a marriage in [another] State that is otherwise unlawful”).  I 
have discussed the point elsewhere.  See Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for 
Family Issues, supra note 2, at 268 (“[W]ere same-sex marriage legalized in Massachu-
setts, the statutes governing the issuance of marriage licenses would preclude couples, 
who could not marry in their home jurisdictions, from marrying in Massachusetts.”). 
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if such marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdic-
tion, and declares any such marriage null and void.24  A second statute 
requires the official issuing a marriage license to a nonresident to be 
satisfied that the person was “not prohibited from intermarrying by 
the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides.”25 
Statutes of this kind reflect a respect by the proposed state of 
celebration for the genuine regulatory interests and values of the par-
ticular community of which the couple is a member.  Interestingly, fol-
lowing the decision in Goodridge, the Attorney General of Massachu-
setts issued an order to municipal clerks in Massachusetts to refrain 
from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples from outside Mas-
sachusetts.26  That order was challenged in subsequent litigation, 
claiming that this was an impermissible discriminatory enforcement 
scheme.27  In rejecting the challenge, a Massachusetts trial court in 
Cote-Whitacre v. Department of Public Health noted that the instructions 
being given to the clerks addressed all marriage impediments—
including impediments based on age, consanguinity or affinity, mari-
tal status or same-gender status—of couples who reside and intend to 
continue to reside in other states.28  Nor was the court persuaded by 
the argument that it was only in the context of same-sex marriages 
that Massachusetts began to take interest in the out-of-state evasion 
marriages  The enforcement in Massachusetts, held the court, was uni-
form and systematic.29 
Legislation dealing with the evasion of domiciliary marriage laws is 
not prevalent in the United States.  The Uniform Law Commissioners 
did propose a Uniform Act on the subject,30 but it was later withdrawn, 
 
24 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, § 11 (Law Co-op. 2003). 
25 Id. § 12. 
26 See Yvonne Abraham, AG Asks End of Out-Of-State Marriage Licenses, BOSTON 
GLOBE, May 22, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WLNR 3566823. 
27 See Yvonne Abraham, Two Lawsuits to Challenge 1913 Law, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
17, 2004, at B5,available at 2004 WLNR 3603779. 
28 See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No. 042656G, 2004 WL 2075557, at 
*10-11 (Mass. Super. Aug. 18, 2004). 
29 Id. at *11. 
30 See the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act, promulgated by the Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1912.  NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAW, 
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 147 (1943).  The Act provided “that if any person residing 
and intending to continue to reside in this state who is disabled or prohibited from 
contracting marriage under the laws of this state shall go into another state or country 
and there contract a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of this state, 
such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this state.” 
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having been adopted by only a very few states.31  Nonetheless, a num-
ber of states do have some type of marriage-evasion provision in their 
statutes.32  And in the marriage laws of many European countries, it is 
very common to find provisions to prevent marriages that evade the 
otherwise appropriate law.33  In some countries the substantive re-
quirements for contracting a marriage are determined for the parties 
by the law of their nationalities, or in some cases their habitual resi-
dences or domiciles.  It is a common requirement that a foreign na-
tional or resident present a certificate from the state of origin showing 
that there are no impediments to the marriage according to the laws 
of that state.34  In the specific context of the few countries that permit 
same-sex marriage, Belgium limits them to those situations where such 
marriages are allowed by the national law of each partner;35 and the 
Netherlands only requires that one of the spouses be a citizen or resi-
dent of the Netherlands, but residency requires formal registration.36  
Several provinces in Canada now permit same-sex marriage37 but at 
 
31 The Act was withdrawn from the list of recommended Uniform Acts in 1943 af-
ter only five states had adopted it.  Id.  Those states were Illinois, Louisiana, Massachu-
setts, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 9 U.L.A. 480 (1942); see also UNIF. MARRIAGE & DI-
VORCE ACT § 210 cmt. 9A U.L.A. 194 (1998). 
32 See Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 12, at 923 n.2 (listing jurisdictions 
that have marriage-evasion statutes). 
33 See Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for Family Issues, supra note 2, at 
249-56. 
34 See, e.g., § 1309 BGB (F.R.G.) (requiring foreigners to verify the legality of their 
marriage in their state). 
35 See Loi ouvrant le mariage à des personnes de même sexe et modifiant certaines 
dispositions du Code civil, Wet tot openstelling van het huwelijk voor personen van 
hetzelfde geslacht en tot wijziging van een aantal bepalingnen van het Burgerlijk Wet-
boek [Law opening marriage to persons of the same sex and amending certain provi-
sions of the Civil Code], ch. II, art. 7 (Feb. 13, 2003), reprinted in 173 Moniteur Belge, 
Belgisch Staatsblad [Stb.] 9825, 9880, available at http://www.notaire.be/info/ 
mariages/020_mariage_entre_personnes_du_meme_sexe_loi.htm. 
36 Wet openstelling huwelijk [Law opening marriage], art. I.E, 2001 Staatsblad van 
het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Stb.] 9 (2001), available at http://www.justitie.nl/ 
pers/persberichten/archief/2000/huwelijk.pdf. 
37 The highest courts in Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec have held that 
limiting marriage to heterosexual couples violates the right to equality in the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  See Halpern v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [2003] 65 
O.R.3d 161, 196 (concluding that the ban on gay marriage was not “reasonable and 
justified in a free and democratic society”); EGALE Can. Inc. v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 
[2003] 225 D.L.R.4th 472, 480 (B.C.) (invalidating a common law bar to same-sex mar-
riage); Hendricks c. Québec, [2004] R.J.Q. 851 (Que. C.A.).  For a discussion of this 
recent Canadian jurisprudence, see Mary Jane Mossman, Conversations About Families in 
Canadian Courts and Legislatures:  Are There “Lessons” for the United States?, 32 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 171, 175-83 (2003). 
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present there do not appear to be residency requirements or other re-
strictions, and thus these Canadian provinces may offer havens for 
nonresidents to obtain a same-sex marriage.38 
The fact that a couple has evaded its home state’s laws does not 
necessarily mean that the home state must refuse to confer benefits 
under its laws to which married persons are entitled.  When a couple 
has contracted an “evasion marriage” and returned to their home 
state, there may still be reasons for that home state to confer certain 
benefits of a marriage valid where celebrated—even if the marriage 
itself would not be valid in the home state.  The classic casebook ex-
ample is In re May’s Estate39 where the New York Court of Appeals con-
ferred upon the spouse a “probate benefit” even though the marriage 
was not permitted under New York law and the parties could be said 
to have “evaded” the law of New York.  Cases of this type are referred 
to as involving an “incidental question” because the validity of the 
marriage is not the direct object of the suit.40  Rather, what is at stake 
is a particular benefit under the couple’s home state law.  At the point 
in time when the issue in May’s Estate arose—thirty-five years after the 
marriage at issue—the only state with a policy to be furthered was that 
of New York.  It is only because the New York statute was written in 
terms of “spouse” that the validity of the marriage was the issue at all.  
The state with the relevant policy in such a situation is New York and 
New York should be free to decide what relationship qualifies as a 
“spouse” within the meaning of its statute.  The parties in May’s Estate 
had lived in New York as husband and wife for thirty-five years, and it 
was proper for New York to decide that a party to a marriage valid 
where celebrated was entitled—after many years of living together as 
spouses in New York—to the benefits generally accorded to a spouse.  
The decision by a trial court in New York, Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospi-
tal,41 permitting a same-sex partner to sue under New York’s wrongful 
 
38 Proposed federal legislation authorizing same-sex marriage is presently before 
the Canadian Parliament.  See Act respecting certain aspects of legal capacity for mar-
riage for civil purposes, Bill C-38, available at http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/fs/ 
ssm/.  The bill does not contain any residency requirement or limitations with respect 
to nonresidents. 
39 114 N.E.2d 4 (N.Y. 1953). 
40 See A.E. Gotlieb, The Incidental Question Revisited—Theory and Practice in the Con-
flict of Laws, 26 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 734, 734 (1977) (defining the “incidental question” 
problem).  See generally SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS (4th ed.) § 13.3, at 561-62 
(2004). 
41 765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 2003). 
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death statute for negligent treatment in a New York hospital,42 is con-
sistent with this view.43  At the same time, however, New York should 
not be required to confer benefits upon parties who “evaded” New 
York marriage law.  A New York court could well decide that it should 
not encourage evasion of its marriage law, and that this purpose is 
best achieved by denying benefits even many years later.  The basic 
point here is that a proper conflict-of-laws analysis indicates that the 
relevant inquiry is for New York—whether through its judges inter-
preting statutes or the legislature defining the scope of benefits—to 
decide whether its law conferring particular benefits extends to these 
parties. 
II.  THE MOBILE MARRIAGE 
A similar principle applies to what I will call the “conflict mobile” 
situation—that is, a case where the parties are validly married in Mas-
sachusetts and only later move to a state that does not permit same-sex 
marriages.44  This is not a case where the marriage policies of the state 
of residence or domicile are evaded.  Unlike the situation of marriage 
evasion, the parties in this scenario comply with the only law that is 
relevant to their relationship at the time of the marriage.  Indeed, 
many of the principles on which conflict-of-laws principles are formu-
 
42 In Langan, the plaintiff and the decedent had entered a civil union in Vermont.  
The existence of this “state sanctioned union” was the basis for the court to distinguish 
cases in which unmarried persons living together—whether heterosexual or homosex-
ual—were not entitled to benefits under New York wrongful death or probate statutes.  
Id. at 416; see also Silberman & Wolfe, Private International Law for Family Issues, supra 
note 2, at 261 n.124 (discussing Langan). 
43 In Langan, as in May’s Estate, the justification of New York’s interest is two-fold.  
The benefit being conferred is derived from a New York statute and the parties were 
domiciled in New York.  New York’s interest in providing the benefit might be less—
although still constitutional—if nonresident parties domiciled in a state prohibiting 
same-sex marriage or union had been injured in New York and sought recovery under 
New York’s wrongful death statute.  Alternatively, in such a case, the New York courts 
might look to whether the law of the state of the parties’ domicile would recognize the 
party as a “spouse.”  See infra Part III (discussing these transient effects). 
44 Several commentators have referred to this as “migratory marriage.”  See Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 21, at 2040-42; Andrew Koppelman, Interstate Recognition 
of Same-Sex Civil Unions:  A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143, 2153-59 (2005) 
[hereinafter Interstate Recognition] (defining migratory marriages and explaining the 
rights that should and should not attach to such marriages).  I use the term “mobile 
marriage” rather than “migratory marriage” to avoid confusion with the well-
entrenched notion of “migratory divorce,” which really is closer to the evasion situa-
tion, even though divorce jurisdiction is predicated on a technical finding of domicile. 
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lated,45 such as upholding expectations of the parties and respect for 
the legitimate interests of sister states, support recognition of the mar-
riage relationship and the conferral of benefits that usually accom-
pany that relationship.  Those rights may include spousal elective 
shares, pension benefits, maintenance, property rights, and invocation 
of marital privilege. 
The factors relied upon to shape choice-of-law principles—
relevant polices of both the forum and of other states, the protection 
of justified expectations, and certainty and predictability—suggest that 
the applicable choice-of-law rule in these validity-of-marriage cases 
should be the law of the state where the parties were domiciled at the time of 
the marriage.46  Analogies can be found in various conflict-of-laws rules 
applicable to the marriage relationship.  Section 283(1) of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides that “[t]he validity of a 
marriage will be determined by the local law of the state which, with 
respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to 
the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated in § 6.”47  
And the presumptive reference to the applicable law in subsection (2) 
 
45 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws lists the following factors as relevant to 
the choice of the applicable rule of law: 
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, 
(b) the relevant policies of the forum, 
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of 
those states in the determination of the particular issue, 
(d) the protection of justified expectations, 
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, 
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and 
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971).  
46 Both I and others have urged this rule in other writing.  See Silberman, Can the 
Island of Hawaii Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 203-04; see also SCOLES ET AL., supra 
note 40, § 13.8, at 572 (“As the continuing marriage relationship is undertaken and ex-
pectations develop, the state most significantly concerned and related would seem to 
be the intended family domicile of the parties, in a mobile society, at the time it 
arises.”); Mark Strasser, For Whom Bell Tolls:  On Subsequent Domiciles’ Refusing to Recog-
nize Same-Sex Marriages, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 339, 341 (1998) (identifying the state of 
domicile at the time of marriage as the state with the most significant interest in the 
validity of same-sex marriages). 
 I use the term “domicile at the time of the marriage” to mean where the parties 
are resident or domiciled immediately before and immediately after the marriage.  
More complex scenarios could involve parties who leave their residence/domicile to 
marry and then to reside in the marriage-celebration state or parties who live in differ-
ent states before their marriage and perhaps even after the marriage.  For purposes of 
the analysis here, I am using only the “paradigm” case.  I also am not focusing on dis-
tinctions between “residency” and “domicile.” 
47 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(1) (1971). 
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of section 283 is the law “where the marriage was contracted . . . unless 
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
the marriage.”48  Comment j to section 283 observes that such policies 
are likely to be those of a state “where at least one of the spouses was 
domiciled at the time of the marriage and where both made their 
home immediately thereafter.”49  As regards the “incidents” of the 
marriage, section 284 of the Restatement (Second) refers back to the 
provisions of section 283.50  Other provisions of the Second Restatement 
adopt a similar rule.  In determining the property rights of spouses in 
movables acquired during the marriage, section 258 of the Restate-
ment (Second) points to the law of the state where the spouses were domi-
ciled at the time of the marriage.51 
Although I urge adoption of a conflict-of-laws rule that would de-
termine the validity of a marriage under the law where the spouses 
were domiciled at the time of the marriage,52 I do not believe such a 
rule is constitutionally compelled.  A second state to which the couple 
moves does have a relevant interest in conferring particular benefits 
under its own law and can, after measuring its interest as compared to 
that of the other state, determine whether it is willing to confer the 
particular benefit.  Its own policy against same-sex marriage may be 
such that it chooses not to privilege the relationship with any eco-
nomic benefits, or it may decide that it only wants to withhold specific 
attributes, for example, the right to adopt.53  The interests of a state in 
bestowing or not bestowing the incidents of marriage are also ac-
knowledged by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws; comment c 
to section 284 relating to “incidents of foreign marriage” observes that 
a “state will not give a particular incident to a foreign marriage when 
to do so would be contrary to its strong local policy.”54  Of course, the 
ability of a state to confer or withhold benefits is constitutional only so 
 
48 Id. § 283(2). 
49 Id. cmt. j. 
50 Section 284, entitled “Incidents of Foreign Marriage,” provides:  “A state usually 
gives the same incidents to a foreign marriage, which is valid under the principles 
stated in § 283, that it gives to a marriage contracted within its territory.”  Id. § 284. 
51 See id. § 258. 
52 See Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 203-04. 
53 See, e.g., Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 804, 827 
(11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a Florida statute prohibiting the adoption of minors by 
homosexual persons was not unconstitutional), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005). 
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 284 cmt. c (1971). 
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long as sexual preference has not become a constitutionally protected 
class for these purposes.55 
 
55 In this Essay I do not address at all the constitutional reverberations emanating 
from Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the United States Supreme Court decision 
holding that a Texas statute criminalizing sodomy between same-sex parties violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  But on the questions of whether same-sex marriage is 
constitutionally compelled under federal due process and equal protection standards, 
I have long thought that there is a difference with respect to whether a state should be 
required to put its “imprimatur” on the relationship by conferring the special and 
symbolic status of marriage and whether it should have to confer equal economic 
rights upon the parties.  That is, a state might be permitted to withhold its “imprima-
tur” so long as it allowed couples an available alternative that provided them with simi-
lar economic benefits.  Such an analysis appears to underlie the legislative action in 
Hawaii and Vermont to provide for reciprocal benefit statutes (Hawaii) or civil unions 
(Vermont).  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C (2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 
(2001).  In Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999), the Vermont Supreme Court, inter-
preting the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution, held that same-sex 
couples were entitled to a right to marriage or its equivalent.  Id. at 867. 
 During one colloquy at the Penn symposium, I was queried about whether the 
constitutional rights of a child might be infringed if a state to which its parents move is 
permitted to determine for itself what benefits or rights to confer regarding the par-
ents’ relationship.  In most situations, the right to a child’s relationship with a parent 
or a right to support from a parent is independent of the marital status of the parents.  
Whether sexual orientation is a factor that can be taken into account in determining 
custody is a different question, compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding 
that consideration of race with respect to determination of custody is unconstitu-
tional), but that issue is also separate from the marital status of a same-sex couple.  The 
situation could arise, however, if a state does tie custody to marital status.  One exam-
ple is a custody or visitation order that results from the presumptive rule adopted in 
many states that when a child is born to a married couple, both of those parties are le-
gal parents.  If a nonbiological “parent” in a same-sex union would not be entitled to 
custody or visitation but for this presumption, it could be said that such a right of cus-
tody or visitation is a “right or claim arising from” a “relationship between persons of 
the same sex that is treated as a marriage.”  Under the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C (2004), such a judgment would not have to be recognized by a sister 
state, even if it otherwise would be entitled to recognition and enforcement under the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, or one of the Uniform Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Acts in effect in all the states. 
 In one recent case, a same-sex couple residing in Virginia entered into a civil un-
ion in Vermont but continued to reside in Virginia for over a year.  One of the part-
ners subsequently gave birth to a daughter in Virginia.  Three months after the girl’s 
birth, the couple and child moved to Vermont, where they lived for over a year.  When 
the relationship ended, the biological mother returned to Virginia with the child.  In a 
proceeding to dissolve the civil union, a Vermont court, relying on the presumption 
that both parties of a marriage are legal parents of any child born during the marriage, 
and equating same-sex union with marriage under Vermont law, recognized a parental 
interest in both women, and awarded the nonbiological parent visitation.  See Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 454-11-03 (Rutland, Vt. Fam. Ct. June 17, 2004).  While 
those proceedings were pending, the biological mother initiated a custody proceeding 
in Virginia, requesting to be named the only legal parent and awarded sole custody.  
The Virginia court awarded her full custody and held that Virginia law recognized nei-
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Several conceptual frameworks in conflict of laws support a state’s 
choice to assert its own policies against same-sex marriage at the ex-
pense of the interests of the state that permitted such marriage, even 
when that state was the domicile at the time of marriage.  The state 
whose benefit is now at issue can be said to be furthering its own pol-
icy over that of a sister state—a common phenomenon in choice of 
law analysis.  Alternatively, a state has been free to refuse to recognize 
the validity or incidents of a marriage where such recognition is mani-
festly incompatible with its public policy.56 
III.  TRANSIENT EFFECTS 
A variation on the above scenario involves the situation where the 
parties marry and continue to reside in a state which allows same-sex 
marriage.  Nonetheless, the interstate activities of the parties may re-
sult in the implication of another state’s law.  For example, an acci-
dent in another state might result in the application of that state’s 
wrongful death statute, and the question would be whether the same-
sex partner qualified as a “spouse” for purposes of that statute.  Or the 
parties may try to avail themselves of a particular benefit, for example, 
a “spousal” voucher, or the right to exercise decision-making power in 
the event one partner is disabled.  Depending upon the particular 
right or benefit in question, the state with such a limited nexus to the 
parties has little interest in what the formal relationship of the couple 
is.  As in the scenario of the “mobile marriage,” the forum state should 
look to the laws of the couple’s state of domicile to determine their 
status, and if the state of domicile would regard the couple as mar-
ried,57 it should accord the rights and benefits to the couple that it 
 
ther same-sex unions nor rights arising therefrom.  Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, CH 
04-280 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2004).  Vermont has since held the biological mother in contempt 
and both cases are being appealed. 
56 See, e.g., Catalano v. Catalano, 170 A.2d 726, 728-29 (Conn. 1961) (finding that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to a “widow’s allowance” as surviving spouse to her uncle 
(the decedent) because the marriage, though valid in Italy where the parties were liv-
ing when they were married, contravened the public policy of Connecticut).  Compare 
In re Dalip Singh Bir’s Estate, 188 P.2d 499 (Cal. App. 1948), where two wives of a Cali-
fornia decedent were permitted to share in the distribution of his estate.  The two mar-
riages had legally taken place in Punjab Province, British India, but the decedent had 
emigrated to California, where he died.  The California court observed that public pol-
icy considerations would seem to apply “only if [the] decedent had attempted to co-
habit with his two wives in California” and not where “only the question of descent of 
property [was] involved.”  Id. at 502. 
57 That status might result from application of the domiciliary state’s own internal 
rule or its recognition of the marriage under choice of law principles.  In effect, a ref-
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would to its own domiciliaries.  But unlike the situation of the mobile 
marriage, where the new state of domicile could be said to have a sig-
nificant interest in whether or not to confer benefits to couples who 
have come into the state after being domiciled elsewhere, in this case 
the forum state has only a transient connection with the parties and 
much less of an interest in furthering its own policies with respect to 
the incentives that conferring or withholding benefits may have upon 
the couple’s formal relationship.  Nonetheless, as a constitutional 
matter, a state that has a significant enough connection to justify ap-
plication of its own law would probably have the power to determine 
the reach of benefits conferred by its own laws.58 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY 
I turn now to the question of public policy and the effect of the 
state Defense of Marriage Acts (DOMAs) as an expression of a state’s 
public policy.59  In cases where the issue is whether a state will confer a 
particular benefit—whether it be a pension right, a right to recover 
under a wrongful death statute, or a probate right—reading too much 
into a mini-DOMA may be a mistake.  A prohibition on same-sex mar-
riage—even one expressed in legislation—does not necessarily mean 
that all economic benefits should be denied.  Interestingly, polls have 
shown that while a substantial majority of the public rejects the idea of 
same-sex marriage,60 a narrow majority also believes that same-sex 
couples should receive equal treatment with respect to economic 
rights.61  That societal judgment may play out in different ways when it 
 
erence to the law of the domicile here might include adoption of a renvoi. 
58 In some situations, that might mean denying benefits even where the couple is 
treated as married by the state of domicile.  In other situations, a state might confer a 
benefit on a couple because its policy is to honor formal unions even if the state of the 
parties’ domicile would not.  See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. 
59 The Defense of Marriage Acts enacted by a large number of states prohibit 
same-sex couples from marrying within the state and provide that the state will refuse 
to recognize marriages between two people of the same sex performed in other states.  
For a catalogue of the various DOMAs, see American Bar Association Section of Family 
Law, A White Paper:  An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and 
Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339, 397-402 (2004). 
60 See, e.g., CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (Mar. 18-20, 2005) (showing that 68% of 
poll respondents thought that same-sex marriages should not be recognized), available 
at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm; Pew Research Center/Pew Forum on Re-
ligion and Public Life Survey (Aug. 5-10, 2004) (60%), available at http:// 
www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm; Quinnipiac University Poll (Dec. 7-12, 2004) (65%), 
available at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm. 
61 A majority responded favorably to the question whether same-sex couples 
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comes to determining whether same-sex couples may obtain rights 
and benefits under state laws that prohibit same-sex marriage.  In 
states that prohibit same-sex marriage but offer civil unions, there 
should be little difference as to whether a party has a right to the par-
ticular benefit as a “domestic partner” or as a spouse.  However, if 
there are differences in the scope of those benefits, the more appro-
priate regime may be that of the domestic partnership.  For example, 
in Germany, the conflict-of-laws rules provide that same-sex partner-
ships registered outside of Germany will not be given any greater 
benefits than those given under the German registered domestic 
partnership law and the German Civil Code.62 
On the other hand, in some states where there are mini-DOMAs, 
domestic partnership benefits are not offered at all.  In such cases, a 
mini-DOMA may be construed to reflect a policy against recognition 
of any rights or economic benefits flowing from the relationship.  
Some state DOMAs are even more explicit.  For example, Nebraska 
enacted a constitutional provision that rejects marriage, domestic 
partnerships, civil unions, or other same-sex relationships, and states 
that “they shall not be valid or recognized in Nebraska.”63  The Ken-
tucky statute not only states that a marriage between members of the 
same sex is against Kentucky public policy64 but a specific provision 
also voids out-of-state same-sex marriages and provides that any rights 
granted by virtue of the marriage, or its termination, shall be unen-
forceable in Kentucky courts.65  No federal constitutional full faith and 
credit challenge is availing either—even with respect to a sister-state 
judgment—since the federal Defense of Marriage Act66 frees states 
from any constitutional obligation of judgment recognition.  Mar-
riages, of course, have always fallen within the “full faith and credit to 
 
should be allowed to form civil unions with the same legal rights as opposite-sex mar-
ried couples.  See, e.g., CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll (March 5-7, 2004) (showing 
54%), available at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil2.htm; Pew Research Cen-
ter/Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life Survey (Aug. 5-10, 2004) (48%), available 
at http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm. 
62 See art. 17b (4) BGB (F.R.G.). 
63 NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 29 (2000). 
64 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.040 (Michie 1998) 
65 Id. § 402.045. 
66 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).  One provision of that Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 1738C, provides that no state is required to give effect to any public act, re-
cord or judicial proceeding of any other state “respecting a relationship between per-
sons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . 
or a right or claim arising from such relationship.” 
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laws” standard and have always been subject to a comparison of inter-
ests and/or public policy.67 
Professor Tobias Wolff’s paper in this Symposium attempts to nu-
ance the reasons that a particular state might refuse to recognize a 
marriage or confer benefits on a same-sex marriage entered else-
where, and he argues that some of those reasons might violate consti-
tutional norms.68  For example, he posits that one reason a state may 
refuse to recognize same-sex marriage is to dissuade couples from mi-
grating to that state because it does not want same-sex couples resid-
ing there.  That reason, Professor Wolff contends, is not a constitu-
tionally acceptable basis for refusing to recognize same-sex marriage.  
Professor Wolff is probably correct about the unconstitutionality of 
such a purpose, assuming that a state would concede that this were its 
purpose.  But that does not advance the inquiry very far because tell-
ing a state that it cannot prevent same-sex couples from taking up 
residence there is far different from requiring that state to confer 
benefits under its laws with respect to relationships that it chooses not 
to privilege.  There is a U.S. Supreme Court divorce case that comes 
to mind in this respect—Simons v. Miami Beach First National Bank69—
where Florida was permitted to affect the rights of a New York “wife” 
who was never served with process in an ex parte divorce proceeding 
in Florida, at least in regard to dower rights conferred by Florida law.  
The Supreme Court held that the Florida decree could not cut off 
economic rights of the wife under New York law but the Florida de-
cree could affect rights under Florida law by defining for itself who 
was a widow.70  In addition, it should be kept in mind that a state that 
refuses to confer benefits on these “new” domiciliaries is treating 
them in the same way that it treats its long-term domiciliaries. 
Professor Andrew Koppelman proposes a different approach that 
a state might take in determining whether the conferral of a particular 
incident of marriage is consistent with its public policy.  He argues 
that if the parties can contract about such a benefit, then the forum 
“cannot coherently be said to have a public policy against them enjoy-
 
67 For a fuller discussion of this point, see Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii Bind 
the World?, supra note 12, at 193-96 (discussing, inter alia, the difference between laws 
and judgments in the context of full faith and credit). 
68 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Dis-
putes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2218-40 (2005). 
69 381 U.S. 81 (1965). 
70 Id. at 85-86. 
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ing that incident.”71  Thus, he suggests that since parties can contract 
about inheritance rights or about making medical decisions about 
one’s partner, conferring such rights cannot be said to violate a state’s 
public policy.  But Professor Koppelman’s analysis really begs the 
question.  If the parties do contract about such rights, a state may have 
no basis other than the sexual behavior of the parties to invalidate 
those contractual rights, and that might well violate the basic principle 
of Lawrence.  But in the absence of a contract, the parties are relying 
upon the state to create their rights, and it is the state’s prerogative 
whether to do so and what relationships it chooses to “privilege.”  In-
deed, some state Defense of Marriage Acts expressly make contractual 
rights arising from marriage unenforceable in their courts.72 
I do, however, agree with both Professors Koppelman and Wolff 
that with greater sensitivity to the genuine concerns of conflict of laws 
a better accommodation of competing state policies would result.  
Even in a totally domestic case, states have drawn distinctions as to 
when and under what circumstances the validity of a marriage can be 
challenged, having to do not only with the strength of the particular 
marriage regulation in question but also with values of reliance, ex-
pectations, and good faith.73  A refined choice of law analysis can do as 
much. 
 
71 See Koppelman, Interstate Recognition, supra note 44, at 2158. 
72 The Georgia statute provides: 
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of this state to recognize the union 
only of man and woman.  Marriages between persons of the same sex are pro-
hibited in this state. 
(b) No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as enti-
tled to the benefits of marriage.  Any marriage entered into by persons of the 
same sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign ju-
risdiction or otherwise shall be void in this state.  Any contractual rights 
granted by virtue of such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this 
state and the courts of this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under 
any circumstances to grant a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to 
such marriage or otherwise to consider or rule on any of the parties’ respec-
tive rights arising as a result of or in connection with such marriage. 
See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996). 
73 Courts and legislatures have used various doctrines—common-law marriage, 
putative spouse, and even estoppel—to confer benefits on couples whose marriage was 
invalid.  See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 242-44 (2d. ed. 2002). 
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V.  “LEGISLATING” CONFLICTS ISSUES 
The conflict-of-laws/private international law issues surrounding 
same-sex marriage are complex, and the differences in state laws are 
likely to result in inconsistency in the recognition of the rights of 
same-sex couples as they move about the United States and elsewhere.  
Indeed, concerns over the lack of comity have been urged as a justifi-
cation for prohibiting same-sex marriages altogether.74  However, bal-
anced choice-of-law rules that reflect the competing interests of the 
relevant states can be incorporated into same-sex marriage and civil 
union provisions so that the relevant communities’ views on these 
questions are respected.  A number of possibilities present themselves.  
Legislation in states that favor same-sex marriage or civil unions is de-
sirable because such legislation offers an opportunity to designate that 
its policies on marriage are directed solely to its residents and domi-
ciliaries and thus respect the interests of other states.  In line with the 
discussion earlier, states should limit the application of their same-sex 
marriage or civil union laws to members of their own community—
either through a residency requirement or by restricting application 
of the law to persons who do not face an impediment to such a mar-
riage under the laws of the jurisdictions where they reside or intend to 
reside.  This approach has met with success in many European coun-
tries.75 
Addressing issues of same-sex marriage and/or civil unions 
through legislation gives states that want to authorize such marriages 
or unions a means to ensure there will be a forum for dissolution of 
such unions if the couple later leaves the state.  Sister states that refuse 
to formalize same-sex relationships may refuse to provide a forum for 
dissolution of a same-sex marriage or union contracted elsewhere, and 
in those circumstances the parties will be left in limbo.76  This was pre-
cisely the situation in Rosengarten v. Downes,77  where parties who were 
not residents of Vermont contracted a civil union in Vermont.  When 
one party tried to dissolve the union in Connecticut, his state of resi-
 
74 The argument was rejected in a recent trial court decision in New York, which 
held that New York’s Domestic Relation Law, which denies marriage licenses and ac-
cess to civil marriage to same-sex couples, violates the Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion Clauses of the New York State Constitution.  Hernandez v. Robles, No. 
103434/2004, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005). 
75 See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text. 
76 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1996); see also Herma Hill Kay, Same-Sex Di-
vorce in the Conflict of Laws, 15 KING’S C. L.J. 63 (2004). 
77 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002) 
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dence, the Connecticut court observed that since Connecticut “does 
not recognize the validity of such a union . . . there is no res to address 
and dissolve.”78  I note that if my own proposal were adopted, Vermont 
would have lacked prescriptive authority to grant civil unions to non-
residents in a case like Rosengarten.  Nonetheless, the problem could 
still arise in the “mobile marriage” scenario—for example, a Vermont 
couple who entered into a civil union but later moved to another 
state.  Under my proposed rule, the new state of residence should ap-
ply the marriage law of the state of residence/domicile of the parties 
at the time of the marriage, recognizing that a valid marriage had oc-
curred and accordingly providing a forum for divorce.  But because a 
state that prohibits same-sex marriage will not necessarily adopt that 
proposed solution, the state that performed the same-sex marriage or 
civil union should also provide for a dissolution remedy in its statutory 
scheme. 
 As for states asked to “recognize” for various purposes a same-
sex relationship entered into elsewhere, the appropriate choice of law 
rule for determining the rights and obligations of same-sex couples 
should also be the law of domicile or residence of the parties at the 
time of the marriage.  Such a rule gives deference to the policies of 
the state that has the most significant connection to the parties, and is 
consistent with predictability and party expectations.  States with “de-
fense of marriage” acts should not further their own policies at the 
expense of the legitimate interests of other states and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties.  While they may have the constitutional 
power to do so, states that choose to prohibit same-sex marriage 
should not undermine the rights of newly-arriving couples from estab-
lished marriages in other states that bestowed marital status upon 
their residents and domiciliaries.  In return, states that decide to favor 
same-sex unions should not try to become the “Nevadas” of same-sex 
marriage.79 
 
 
78 Id. at 175. 
79 I have made this point in other writing.  See Silberman, Can the Island of Hawaii 
Bind the World?, supra note 12, at 208. 
